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The Major Questions Doctrine: How the
Supreme Court’s Efforts to Rein in the
Effects of Chevron Have Failed to Meet
Expectations
Andrew Howayeck*
INTRODUCTION

“Executive lawmaking is central to modern governance.”1
While this fact seems to be at odds with the Constitution, the
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has
recognized that, in today’s “complex society,” Congress “cannot do
its job” unless it has the power to delegate its legislative authority
under “broad general directives.”2 The Supreme Court, in its 1984
landmark decision, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., declared that courts shall defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that Congress
has empowered the agency to administer.3 This deferential
standard of review has been abused by presidential administrations
and has been reduced to a tool of statutory interpretation at the

* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2020;
B.A., Stonehill College, 2017. Thank you to Professor Jonathan Gutoff for his
guidance throughout the writing process.
1. Gary Lawson, Representative/Senator Trump?, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 111,
116 (2018).
2. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
3. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).
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agency level.4 Without any check in place to discourage this,
Congress has been able to avoid the laborious legislative process by
empowering agencies to enact rules that decide questions Congress
is unable to resolve through the legislative process. The Supreme
Court’s response to this practice is the so-called “major questions
doctrine.”5 This doctrine has been invoked few times, and some
scholars even question its existence.6 Assuming it does exist, the
Supreme Court has never articulated a standard for when the
doctrine is properly invoked, creating confusion among scholars and
the federal circuit courts.
This Comment attempts to articulate when the major
questions doctrine applies and argues that, without further
guidance from the Supreme Court, the doctrine is rather toothless.
Part I of this Comment discusses Chevron deference and illustrates
why there should be a check on its scope. Part II provides a
background of the major questions doctrine. Part III explains how
the doctrine is, in effect, toothless, and why it will remain so
without further guidance from the Supreme Court concerning when
it applies.
I.

CHEVRON DEFERENCE

In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard
of review for agency interpretation of statutes. This framework is
two-part. First, if “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue” and “the intent of Congress is clear, . . . courts,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”7 However, if the statute is “silent or
ambiguous,” courts must defer to an agency’s “permissible
construction of the statute.”8 This decision was premised on the
belief that Congress sometimes implicitly delegates legislative
authority to agencies to “fill any gap left” in a particular statute.9
In such a case, the Supreme Court held, “a court may not substitute
4. See Gary Lawson, Dirty Dancing—The FDA Stumbles with the
Chevron Two-Step: A Response to Professor Noah, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 937
(2008).
5. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
6. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 673 (7th ed. 2015).
7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
8. Id. at 843.
9. Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
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its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”10
The impact that Chevron has had on American government
cannot be understated. It is now the most cited Supreme Court case
concerning administrative law and has fundamentally altered the
legislative process. This Part explains how Chevron has birthed a
legislative process that is less democratically accountable and
illustrates why there should be a check on its scope.
A. Chevron has divested power from Article III courts to the
executive branch.
The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with the exclusive
power to say what the law is, and the Chevron doctrine undermines
this authority.11 A statute that Congress has authorized an agency
to administer may have countless “reasonable” interpretations, and
these interpretations may vary drastically depending on the
presidential administration. Who is to decide which of the many
reasonable interpretations is the “correct” one? Under Chevron, it
is up to the agency. Even if the Supreme Court would find that the
best interpretation of a statute contradicts an agency’s
interpretation, so long as the agency’s interpretation is a
“reasonable” one, the agency is free to ignore the judgement of the
Court, which would have found the agency’s interpretation
unlawful. This is a result that Justice Scalia found “not only
bizarre,” but “probably unconstitutional.”12
Chevron is formally a “standard of review,” but is functionally
a misguided “tool of statutory interpretation at the agency level.”13
Judicial deference is “premised on the initial decision maker’s goodfaith effort to get the right answer.”14 Therefore, it would be
inappropriate “for an agency to use Chevron deference as a tool to
protect its initial law findings.”15 As inappropriate as it may be,
agencies under Chevron are empowered to make it their “mission”

10. Id. at 844.
11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
12. Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 1017 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 930.
14. Id. at 932.
15. Id. at 932–33.
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to find a “‘reasonable,’ rather than correct, interpretation” of a
statute in order to advance policy objectives embraced by the
incumbent presidential administration.16 According to Justice
Thomas, “[s]tatutory ambiguity thus becomes an implicit
delegation of rule-making authority, and that authority is used not
to find the best meaning of the text, but to formulate legally binding
rules to fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency
rather than Congress.”17 Permitting politically-motivated agencies
to resolve difficult policy questions necessarily creates a risk for
consequential misuse of Chevron at the agency level.18
Chevron has also changed the role of the executive branch. The
president of the United States has fairly little power over domestic
affairs, as prescribed in the Constitution, and “must have statutory
authority in order to act” in the “domestic, social, and economic
realms.”19 But now, presidents are increasingly promoting the use
of agencies as an “extension of [their] own [executive] policy and
political agenda.”20 Indeed, “[w]e live today in an era of presidential
administration.”21 The number of pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations is nearly four times that of the Unites States Code.22
Agencies have legislative, executive, and judicial functions; without
“requirements of quorums, cloture, or majority votes to stand in the
way of [presidential] lawmaking,” presidents have found it
advantageous to carry out their political agenda through
agencies.23 It cannot be doubted that “executive lawmaking is
central to modern governance.”24
One may wonder how Chevron is implicated in this
phenomenon. Imagine that a liberal Congress passes a statute that
promotes a liberal agenda, and that the statute is signed by the
16. See id. at 937.
17. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
18. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 933.
19. Coal. for Responsible Reg., Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785,
at *22 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2.
20. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2246 (2001).
21. Id.
22. Lawson, supra note 1, at 116.
23. Id. at 118.
24. Id. at 116.
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president and made into law. If a conservative president’s political
agenda is founded on dismantling the liberal statute, and if she
does not have the support of Congress, she may attempt to
undermine legislative intent through executive agencies. She may
direct agencies enabled to promulgate the law to find “permissible”
interpretations of key provisions in a way that weakens the statute.
So long as the new interpretation is “reasonable,” courts cannot
second-guess this interpretation. Without clear canons of statutory
interpretation that guide a court’s analysis (i.e., if a court should
only look at the text of the statute or look to other things, such as
legislative history), whether an agency’s interpretation is judged
“reasonable” may vary widely based on a number of factors. With
the potential for such great deference, it is not unfair to say that
Chevron has enabled presidents, in effect, to “rewrite” laws
concerning domestic matters in a way that is favorable to their
political agenda while evading constitutionally prescribed forms of
lawmaking in a manner that bears a resemblance to the
unconstitutional “line item veto.”
Some would argue that these grievances are misplaced and
should be aimed at the administrative state in general, and not
Chevron.25 To be clear, Chevron did not create the current
administrative state, but it has strengthened it. It is true that
Chevron is only a standard of review, but it is a standard of review
that permits politically motivated, non-elected officials to interpret
the words of Congress, which were adopted in a laborious and
bicameral way, in a manner that favors the current presidential
administration. Chevron permits the possibility that an agency
may “reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime based merely on
the shift of political winds and still prevail.”26 In the words of
Justice Gorsuch, then a Circuit Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Chevron “seems to have added
prodigious new powers to an already titanic administrative
state.”27

25. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability,
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1398 (2017).
26. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 1155.
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B. Chevron weakens Congress’s legislative process.
Legislating is a laborious process. Under the Constitution,
enacting legislation requires the agreement of the House of
Representatives, the Senate, and the president. If either chamber
of Congress disagrees with a piece of legislation, it cannot become
law. If both chambers agree and the President does not agree,
legislation can only become law if two-thirds of both chambers of
Congress override the President’s veto. Such an override is a
legislative feat; as of 2014, among the more than 2,500 presidential
vetoes in American history, only five percent have been
overridden.28 Further, members of Congress are elected directly by
the people.29 Legislating is a conciliatory process, and the
Constitution guarantees that this already laborious process is
driven by a sense of accountability—if people are unhappy with
Congress’s job performance, they may express their frustration
through the democratic process. This is all to say that the
Constitution demands that legislation be made through the most
democratically accountable process. Chevron diminishes this
accountability by permitting agency executives to “exploit
ambiguous laws as license for their own prerogative.”30
Chevron enables and encourages Congress to bypass the
constitutionally mandated requirements of passing legislation.
Reelection is among the most important factors that underlie the
decisions of Congressional members,31 whose chances of reelection
are dependent on public opinion. Chevron enables Congress to draft
statutes with “ambiguous language to reduce legislative delays
caused by continued debate over statutory terms and shift the
political costs of undesirable decisions from legislators . . . to
bureaucrats.”32 That allows members of Congress to take credit for
positive aspects of a regulatory scheme and distance themselves
from unfavorable aspects.33 While such a system surely expedites
the legislative process, accountability is diminished because heads

28. Veto, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/veto
(last updated Aug. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T7JS-FPJE].
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII.
30. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
31. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (1990).
32. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 25, at 1455.
33. Id.
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of agencies are not directly accountable to the people. Chevron
encourages “[a] form of Lawmaking Made Easy,”34 where Congress
need not debate controversial statutory terms that agencies now
may provide themselves.
Consider how this plays out in practice. Coalition for
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, dealt with the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) “implementation of the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration provisions of the Clean Air Act.”35 The
Clean Air Act was “designed to maintain state and local compliance
with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards” (NAAQS).36
“The NAAQS are . . . established for six air pollutants: carbon
monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particle pollution, and
sulfur dioxide.”37 The “statute requires stationary facilities that
emit certain air pollutants to obtain permits before beginning new
construction.”38 The relevant issue before the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) was
whether the term “air pollutant” for the purposes of the statutory
permitting requirement gave EPA power to regulate greenhouse
gases such as carbon dioxide in addition to pollutants identified in
the NAAQS.39 The court found that EPA could regulate greenhouse
gases such as carbon dioxide.40
Justice Kavanaugh, at that time a Circuit Judge of the D.C.
Circuit, dissenting along with Judge Brown, would have found that
EPA did not possess the authority to read the statute so broadly.41
According to the dissenters, the CAA received extreme scrutiny
during the legislative process, was crafted with “great specificity
and care,” and the issue of whether to regulate greenhouse gases
was fully contemplated by Congress and was rejected, as evidenced
by the fact that “hundreds of bills concerning greenhouse gases

34. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
35. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL
6621785, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The
opinions cited are related to the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc. Id.
at *1 (per curiam).
36. Id. at *14 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 745(a)(1), 7479(1)).
39. Id.
40. See id. at *2 (Sentelle, C.J., concurring).
41. Id. at *14 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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regulation were proposed and rejected between 1990 and 2009.”42
In his dissent, Judge Brown found that the court’s decision
impermissibly empowered EPA
to “steamroll
through
Congressional gridlock.”43 Further, Judge Brown would have found
that the major questions doctrine prohibited such a delegation of
power.44
The majority found that the statute at issue
unambiguously conferred upon EPA the power to regulate
greenhouse gases, but Justice Kavanaugh would have found that
the “EPA ha[d] exceeded its statutory authority.”45
II. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

The major questions doctrine is the Supreme Court’s attempt
at limiting the scope of Chevron. It should be noted that some
scholars question its existence: Professor Gary Lawson, for
example, questions whether all of the relevant case holdings may
be explained on more “mundane grounds without positing a freefloating but unstated ‘major issues’ inquiry.”46 It is notable that
this doctrine has never been stated in express terms by the
Supreme Court.47 There is not even a consensus on what it is
called. Most scholars call it the “major questions” doctrine;
Professor Lawson sometimes refers to it as the “major issues”
doctrine, and Justice Kavanaugh refers to it as the “major rules”
doctrine. This Comment assumes that it does exist and refers to it
as the major questions doctrine, which is consistent with the
vernacular used by the Supreme Court in its adoption. This Part
provides an overview of the cases that have invoked the doctrine
and attempts to articulate a standard for when it applies under
current case law.
42. Id. at *5–6 (Brown, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at *5.
44. See id. at *12.
45. Id. at *14 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
46. LAWSON, supra note 6, at 673.
47. It should be noted that on June 20, 2019 the United States Supreme
Court decided Gundy v. United States, in which a dissenting opinion, written
by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,
briefly discusses the major questions doctrine. See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). It is notable that Gundy concerned review
under the nondelegation doctrine and Chevron was not implicated. See id. at
2121 (majority opinion). Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the
consideration or decision of the case.
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The major questions doctrine was first clearly invoked by the
Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation.48 There, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
granted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority “to
regulate, among other items, ‘drugs’ and ‘devices.’”49 The FDA
interpreted this as giving it the authority to regulate tobacco
products, reasoning that nicotine is a “drug” and cigarettes are
“devices” that deliver nicotine.50 In its Chevron “step one” analysis,
the Supreme Court found that its “inquiry into whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue is shaped, at
least in some measure, by the nature of the question presented.”51
The opinion went on to state that “Congress is more likely to have
focused upon . . . major questions, while leaving interstitial matters
[for agencies to address].”52 The Court reasoned that Chevron
deference “is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to
fill in the statutory gaps,” but in extraordinary cases, there should
be hesitation before presuming that Congress intended an implicit
delegation.53
Such hesitation was warranted in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation where the FDA had asserted
jurisdiction to “regulate an industry constituting a significant
portion of the American economy.”54 After Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation, the elusive major questions doctrine is said to
have been invoked, though implicitly, in only a couple of Supreme
Court decisions.55
One such case is Gonzales v. Oregon, which concerned whether
the Attorney General of the United States could interpret a
regulation—promulgated by the Attorney General himself—in a
48. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). The doctrine can even be traced back to MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S.
218 (1994).
49. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
50. Id. at 127.
51. Id. at 159.
52. Id. (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70
VAND. L. REV. 777, 790, 793–94 (2017); e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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way that restricted the use of controlled substances for physicianassisted suicide.56 The Controlled Substances Act gave the
Attorney General the authority to “de-register” physicians if the
Attorney General determined that this would be in the “public
interest.”57 The Attorney General’s own regulation required that
prescriptions for controlled substances “be issued for a legitimate
medical purpose.”58 The issue before the Court was whether an
interpretative statement issued by the Attorney General declaring
that assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” and is
“inconsistent with the public interest,” thus subjecting doctors
engaged in this practice (who were authorized to do so by Oregon
law) to suspension or revocation of their medical licenses, was
entitled to Chevron deference. Quoting Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation, the Court found that “Congress could not
have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”59 The Court
reasoned that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does
not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes,” and that “the idea that
Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual
authority through an implicit delegation . . . is not sustainable.”60
Another such case is Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, in
which the Supreme Court considered the same issue before the D.C.
Circuit in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc: whether EPA
had the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act.61 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, took Justice
Kavanaugh’s position that the Clean Air Act did not “compel” EPA’s
proffered “interpretation” that it had authority to regulate
greenhouse gases.62 While the Court did not speak of “major
questions,” it quoted the familiar language of Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation:

56. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 248–50.
57. Id. at 251.
58. Id. at 250.
59. Id. at 267.
60. Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 458
(2001)).
61. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 (2014).
62. Id. at 2439.
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When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute
an unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of
the American economy,” we typically greet its
announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect
Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
decisions of vast “economic and political significance.”63
The challenged regulation would have subjected “smaller
industrial sources” that were not previously regulated, such as
“residential buildings, hotels, large retail establishments, and
similar facilities,” to the “stationary sources” permitting
requirements.64 The Court struck down the regulation, finding it
would “bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in
EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional
authorization.”65
Hence, EPA was not entitled to Chevron
deference because it impermissibly answered a “major question”
without clear congressional authorization.66

63. Id. at 2444.
64. Id. at 2436 (citing 73 Fed. Reg. 44,420, 44,498–99 (2008)).
65. Id. at 2444.
66. For “completeness,” in the words of Justice Kavanaugh, another case
warrants mention: King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). U.S. Telecom Ass’n
v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 n.2 (2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In King, the
Supreme Court reviewed whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could
promulgate a rule that interpreted Section 36B of the IRS Code, which “allows
an individual to receive tax credits only if the individual enrolls . . . through
‘an Exchange established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031],’” as making
available tax credits to a person enrolled in “an Exchange” regardless of
whether the Exchange is established by a State. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
The Court refused to afford the IRS Chevron deference, despite finding that 42
U.S.C. § 18031 (as set out in Section 36B of the IRS Code) is ambiguous,
because the tax credits involved billions of dollars in annual spending and the
IRS had “no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.” See id.
at 2488–91.
Though this decision seemingly invokes the major questions doctrine,
Justice Kavanaugh takes the position that the case “stand[s] for the distinct
proposition that Chevron deference may not apply when an agency interprets
a major government . . . appropriations provision of a statute.” U.S. Telecom
Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 421 n.2. This position is supported by others, like Professor
Sohoni, who agree with Justice Kavanaugh and assert that King should be
“understood to be confined to [its] domain.” An agency may not claim “that a
statute implicitly delegates to the agency the power to cause large amounts of
federal money to be spent.” Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV 1419, 1422, 1433 (2018). When King is viewed in that light, it is apparent
that it is “somewhat different from the prototypical major rules cases because
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The major questions doctrine cannot be understood through
precise mechanical application. Though the Court in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation supposedly invoked this doctrine
at step one, the doctrine stands for the proposition that Congress
does not implicitly delegate to agencies the authority to promulgate
“major” rules that decide important questions that Congress itself
should have resolved.67 Because the major questions doctrine
limits whether Chevron applies at all, Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation “seem[s] to be [a] Step Zero decision[] in Step One
Guise.”68 Moreover, in Utility Air Regulatory Group, the Court’s
language in finding that (1) the Clean Air Act did not “compel”
EPA’s rule, and (2) that EPA’s rule was unreasonable, seems like a
Step Two decision. The major questions doctrine should thus be
understood by its most basic lesson as illustrated in the
aforementioned cases: “If an agency wants to exercise expansive
regulatory authority over some major social or economic activity
. . . an ambiguous grant of statutory authority is not enough.
Congress must clearly authorize an agency to take such a major
regulatory action.”69
III. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE IS A TOOTHLESS JUDICIAL TOOL

The sparse and inconsistent invocation of the major questions
doctrine illustrates that it is a toothless judicial tool when it comes
to limiting the scope of Chevron. This Part argues that the major
questions doctrine has been largely ineffective at limiting the scope
of Chevron and advocates for guidance from the Supreme Court
that articulates a clear standard for when Chevron applies.
Given that major legislation has been struck down by the major
questions doctrine, one may be surprised to learn the words “major
questions doctrine” do not appear in any Supreme Court decision,
the agency in that particular rule was not seeking to regulate or de-regulate
(as opposed to tax or subsidize) some major private activity.” U.S. Telecom
Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 421 n.2. If King and the other major questions cases are
“lump[ed] together,” according to Professor Sohoni, “the consequence will be
[for courts] to skip the other major questions cases forward—to Step Zero—and
thereby unnecessarily erode Chevron’s domain.” Sohoni, supra at 1433.
67. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33
(2000); Coenen & Davis, supra note 55, at 781 n.9 (2017).
68. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 248 (2006).
69. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 (2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
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and are found in only two dissenting opinions from the D.C. Circuit:
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. and United States
Telecom Association.70
In both cases, the majority upheld
delegations of power assumed by the respective agencies and, in
both dissenting opinions, Justice Kavanaugh advocated for the
invocation of the major questions doctrine. Justice Kavanaugh
explained the major questions doctrine at length in United States
Telecom Association v. FCC, and his dissent illustrates how the
doctrine is rather toothless.
In United States Telecom Association, the D.C. Circuit denied
petitions for rehearing en banc of a ruling upholding the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2015 Open Internet Order,
also known as the “Net Neutrality Rule” (the Rule).71 The case
addressed the proper regulatory classification of broadband
internet service under the Communications Act.72 Congress
enacted the Communications Act in 1934 and amended it in 1996.73
It was “originally designed to regulate telephone service providers
as common carriers.”74 The Act “authorizes heavy common-carrier
regulation of telecommunications services but light regulation of
information services.”75 Before the Rule, the FCC regulated
internet service provided over cable systems as an information
service, the lighter regulatory model, and it treated broadband
(cable) differently than digital subscriber line (DSL).76 The FCC
classified DSL as a “telecommunications service” for the purposes
of the Communications Act while classifying broadband as an
“information service.”77 Telecommunications providers are treated
as “common carriers” that must afford neutral and
nondiscriminatory access to their services and avoid unjust and
unreasonable practices.78 Information services are not considered
70. Id. at 383 (Srinivasan, J., concurring); Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
20, 2012) (Brown, J., dissenting).
71. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 382 (Srinivasan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 383.
73. Id. at 394 (Brown, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 424 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 383 (Srinivasan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 383–84 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975, 978, 1000 (2005)).
78. Id. (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 975–76, 1000).
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“common carriers” and are subject to less regulation and
oversight.79 “[T]he [Communications] Act is ambiguous about
whether internet service is an information service or a
telecommunications service.”80 By classifying internet service as a
telecommunications service, the FCC imposed “onerous commoncarrier regulations on internet service providers.”81
Justice Kavanaugh would have struck down the rule
because, in his view, it is a “major rule” that Congress had not
clearly authorized the FCC to promulgate.82 According to Justice
Kavanaugh, an agency may promulgate “major rules,” but only if
Congress has clearly authorized it to do so; conversely, he opined
that “[i]f a statute only ambiguously supplies authority for the
major rule, the rule is unlawful.”83 While there is no bright-line
test for what constitutes a “major rule,” several factors are relevant,
including “the amount of money involved for regulated and affected
parties, the overall impact on the economy, the number of people
affected, and the degree of congressional and public attention to the
issue.”84 The doctrine, according to Justice Kavanaugh, stands on
two presumptions: “(i) a separation of powers-based presumption
against the delegation of major lawmaking authority from Congress
to the Executive Branch . . . and (ii) a presumption that Congress
intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave those
decisions to agencies.”85 In sum, “while the Chevron doctrine allows
an agency to rely on statutory ambiguity to issue ordinary rules,
the major rules doctrine prevents an agency from relying on
statutory ambiguity to issue major rules.”86
In support of his contention that the Rule was “major,” Justice
Kavanaugh emphasizes that there was a huge political debate
about net neutrality: Congress had debated regulation for years.87
79. Id. at 384 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 975–76).
80. Id. at 424 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 425.
82. Id. at 417.
83. Id. at 419.
84. Id. at 422–23 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2443–44 (2014)).
85. Id. at 419 (citing Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Ins.,
448 U.S. 607, 645–46 (1980)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 423. Justice Kavanaugh provided a litany of legislative examples
to underscore the intensive debate on net neutrality. See id.
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When the FCC proposed the Rule it received over four million
comments from the public.88 Even President Obama publicly
weighed in on the issue, which was highly unusual.89 The Rule
“fundamentally transforms the Internet by prohibiting Internet
service providers from choosing the content they want to transmit
to consumers and from fully responding to their customers'
preferences.”90 Further, the Rule “will affect every Internet service
provider, every Internet content provider, and every Internet
consumer.”91 “The financial impact of the rule—in terms of the
portion of the economy affected, as well as the impact on investment
in infrastructure, content, and business—is staggering.”92 Given
these circumstances, Justice Kavanaugh forcefully argued that
“[t]he net neutrality rule is a major rule under any plausible
conception of the major rules doctrine” and “any other conclusion
would fail the straight-face test.”93
Justice Kavanaugh took great care to explain the significance
of the major questions doctrine and the importance that it has in
American government. The fact that judges presume “Congress
does not delegate its authority to settle or amend major social and
economic policy decisions” is fundamental to maintaining the
Constitution’s separation of powers.94 The doctrine recognizes that
“a major policy change should be made by the most democratically
accountable process—Article I, Section 7 legislation.”95 Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent even discusses an empirical study that found
that the doctrine “reflects congressional intent and accords with the
in-the-arena reality of how legislators and congressional staff
approach the legislative function” because drafters “don’t intend to
leave [major policy questions] unresolved.”96 The major questions
88. Id.
89. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Statement by the President on
Internet Neutrality, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 841 (Nov. 10, 2014)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 424 (quoting Brown, J., dissenting at 402).
94. Id. at 422 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A
PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 288 (2016)).
95. Id. (quoting ESKRIDGE, supra note 94, at 289)).
96. Id. at 423 (quoting Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1003 (2013)).
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doctrine, therefore, acts as a safeguard to ensure that Congress is
the final authority when it comes to answering major political
questions and that the Executive Branch does not use congressional
inaction as a license to “legislate” on its own. This is consistent with
constitutionally prescribed democratic values and, thus, it is
inappropriate for judges to afford Chevron deference to agencies
that use statutory ambiguity as a source for their authority to
promulgate “major” rules.
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion makes one thing crystal clear: the
major questions doctrine is rather toothless. “If the Supreme
Court’s major rules doctrine means what it says, then the net
neutrality rule is unlawful . . . .”97 Justice Kavanaugh found
striking parallels between the facts of United States Telecom
Association and the “major questions” test set out in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation and applied in Utility Air
Regulatory Group.98
Notably, the FCC’s use of the
Communications Act of 1934 as the source for its authority to
reclassify broadband internet service seems much like “an agency
claim[ing] to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power
to regulate a significant portion of the American economy.”99 In the
words of Justice Kavanaugh, “[t]he Court in [Utility Air Regulatory
Group] might as well have been speaking about the net neutrality
rule.”100
United States Telecom Association represents the kind of
executive lawmaking that the major questions doctrine is intended
to prohibit. If the Rule is not one of vast “economic and political
significance” then it is difficult to imagine where the line is drawn.
According to Justice Kavanaugh, “[t]he FCC adopted the net
neutrality rule because the agency believed the rule to be wise
policy and because Congress would not pass it.”101 This is precisely
what his colleague Judge Brown cautioned about in Coalition for
Responsible Regulation: Agencies using congressional inaction as a

97. Id. at 418.
98. See id. at 424.
99. Id. (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 426.
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license to “steamroll through congressional gridlock” to make policy
that they—agencies headed by unelected bureaucrats—endorse.102
The major questions doctrine will remain toothless so long as
the Supreme Court fails to invoke it in explicit terms and clearly
articulate what constitutes a “major question.” Even Justice
Kavanaugh concedes that “determining whether a rule constitutes
a major rule sometimes has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’
quality.”103
This is troubling, and United States Telecom
Association may be the most egregious example of a court
permitting an executive agency to answer a question that Congress
lacked the political will to answer through Article I legislation. In
his criticism of Chevron, Justice Gorsuch quoted Justice
Frankfurter’s observation that “‘[t]he accretion of dangerous power
does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the
generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions imposed’
by the Constitution.”104 Executive agencies have an inherent
incentive to disregard the restrictions imposed by the Constitution,
and the major questions doctrine was created to act as a check on
agencies’ asserted authority. After all, “[a]mbition must be made
to counteract ambition.”105 A Supreme Court decision that
explicitly invokes the major questions doctrine will not only make
clear to agencies the bounds of their authority but will also force
Congress to “speak clearly” when it wishes for agencies to resolve
major questions while simultaneously ensuring that the “gaps” that
Congress “implicitly” intends for agencies to fill are actually
implicit.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The major questions doctrine will remain a toothless doctrine
so long as the Supreme Court fails to invoke it in explicit terms and
clearly articulate what constitutes a “major question.” Of course,
the major questions doctrine is a judicially created response to the
judicially created problem that is Chevron. A more sensible
102. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012
WL 6621785, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Brown, J., dissenting).
103. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
104. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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solution is for Congress to address this problem through legislation.
After all, Chevron is not a Constitutional decision and may be
overridden by an act of Congress. This Part discusses these options
in turn.
A. The Supreme Court should clearly embrace the major
questions doctrine.
The most obvious solution to the ineffectiveness of the major
questions doctrine is for the Supreme Court to clearly embrace the
doctrine. The doctrine stands for an important exception to
congressional delegation and it goes to the heart of American
exceptionalism: “a major policy change should be made by the most
democratically accountable process.”106 It will remain a toothless
“shadow doctrine” unless the Supreme Court gives it the credence
that other doctrines of similar importance have received.107
Litigants cannot expect to avail themselves of a doctrine that
has only been meaningfully discussed in dissenting opinions. The
majority in United States Telecom Association correctly observed
that it was “unsurprising that none of the petitioning parties, no
member of the original panel . . . and neither of the dissenting
Commissioners objected to the FCC’s Order as infringing [the major
rules] doctrine.”108 While the concurrence questioned whether that
was so because the Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services
foreclosed such an argument, it was more likely attributable to the
doctrine’s objectively obscure foundation and lack of supporting
precedent.109
106. United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 422; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE
JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 288–89 (2016).
107. The term “shadow doctrine” has been used to describe judicially
created rules with minimal bases that are not very well fleshed out. See, e.g.,
George Washington Univ. v. D.C, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
108. United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 387.
109. Id. In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, the Court afforded Chevron deference to the FCC’s
construction of the Communications Act of 1934 that exempted broadband
cable companies from compulsory common-carrier regulation. 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005). In United States Telecom Ass’n, Justice Kavanaugh took issue with
the FCC’s position that the source of its authority to implement net neutrality
is the ambiguity that the Brand X Court found in the Communications Act of
1934. According to Justice Kavanaugh, “finding of statutory ambiguity is a
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The D.C. Circuit—often hailed as the second most important
court after the Supreme Court—has struggled to apply the doctrine.
In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., the concurrence did
not expressly mention the doctrine over Judge Brown’s dissent that
called for its invocation to prevent EPA from “steamroll[ing]
through Congressional gridlock” without clear authorization.110 In
United States Telecom Association, the concurrence acknowledged
the doctrine but in a manner that could hardly sound more than
disingenuous. The concurrence referred to the major questions
doctrine as “a doctrine [Justice Kavanaugh] gleans from certain
Supreme Court decisions.”111 The majority refused to “resolve” the
“existence or precise contours” of the doctrine, and discussed it,
arguendo, only as the dissenters “expounded it.”112 While the
doctrine is considered by many scholars to be of exceptional
importance, it will have little impact if a panel of judges on the D.C.
Circuit dismiss it as though Justice Kavanaugh himself invented
it.113
Given the unwillingness of lower courts to meaningfully
consider the major questions doctrine, it is now apparent that only
the Supreme Court can change the existing narrative. The Court
missed an opportunity in Utility Air Regulatory Group when,
although the majority took Justice Kavanaugh’s position that the
Clean Air Act did not “compel” EPA’s proffered “interpretation” that
it had the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, the Court did not
expressly invoke the doctrine.114
In fact, a Supreme Court decision that, at a minimum,
expressly acknowledges the major questions doctrine may be
imminent. Justice Gorsuch has expressly called for Chevron to be
reconsidered, and Justice Kavanaugh, of course, has been the sole,
staunch advocate of the major questions doctrine from the bench.

bar” to an agency’s authority to promulgate “major rules.” 855 F.3d at 425
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
110. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012
WL 6621785, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Brown, J., dissenting).
111. United States Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 383 (Srinivasan, J.,
concurring).
112. Id.
113. See id. (“Our colleague understands those decisions to give rise to a
‘major rules’ doctrine.”).
114. See 573 U.S. 302, 315 (2014).
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Now that Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh have been
elevated to the Supreme Court, a decision concerning Chevron and
its limitations is almost certain to come. Even if Justice Kavanaugh
finds himself, once again, arguing for the invocation of the doctrine
in a dissenting opinion, the majority will have to respond to his
argument and finally shed some light on this “shadow doctrine.”115
B. Congress can enact legislation that limits the authority of
agencies.
Of course, Congress could simply enact legislation that limits
the authority of agencies. Chevron effectively shifted legislative
power to the executive branch and the major questions doctrine
functions to ensure that major assertions of authority, by the
executive branch, have been vetted through Article I legislation.
Congress, being a co-equal branch of government to the executive
and judiciary, should be expected to protect its power; however,
legislation to that effect appears unlikely.
Perhaps dissatisfaction with Chevron should be redirected to
Congress’s complacency with the decision. It has been argued that
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Chevron “worked to discourage
unconstitutional delegations of power by putting Congress on notice
that, if it delegated power, its institutional rival, the President,
would be empowered and not the congressional oversight
committees and subcommittees.”116 The thriving administrative
state—coupled with Congress’s willingness to regularly defer its
legislative authority to agencies—suggests that Chevron has not
had the deterrent effect that Justice Stevens may have hoped for.
A sensible congressional response, according to Professor
Garrett, would be legislation in the form of “a broad statute
allocating the law-interpreting power to either agencies or courts
with respect to all questions of ambiguous language, or perhaps
assigning the power to agencies in certain defined circumstances
(such as when they use particular procedures) and to courts in all

115. In Gundy v. United States, despite the major questions doctrine being
discussed by the dissent, the majority did not respond because (1) the case did
not concern Chevron; and (2) the dissent did not advocate for the doctrine’s
invocation. See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
116. Steven G. Calabresi et al., The Rise and Fall of the Separation of
Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 545 (2012).

2020]

REVIEW OF AGENCY LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

193

other instances.”117 This is seemingly advantageous to Congress,
as it has technical advantages over courts in understanding agency
action and resolving relevant ambiguities through “its institutional
design, access to experts, repeat interactions with the agency, and
a more comprehensive perspective.”118 Such a move by Congress,
however, appears unlikely.
While encouraging a system of separation of powers that stays
true to the Framers’ intent is clearly a judicial priority, evidence
suggests that Congress is increasingly committed to its evolving
role in law execution. “As a matter of practice, Congress has carved
out for itself a huge role in law execution through the oversight and
appropriations process.”119 This role is hampered by lengthy
debate over legislation and Chevron, in effect, takes that pressure
off Congress. One facet of the problem is that Congress “desire[s]
to sometimes avoid making difficult political decisions or use opentextured language to garner majority support for controversial
bills.”120 Thus, it appears that Congress is less concerned with
protecting its unique legislative power from its institutional rival,
the executive branch, than it is with taking advantage of a “form of
Lawmaking Made Easy,” where Congress need not debate
controversial statutory terms that agencies now may provide
themselves.121 Without congressional motivation to assert itself as
the only constitutionally delegated lawmaking authority, it is clear
that the burden to limit the scope of Chevron rests on the shoulders
of the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

The major questions doctrine was created to “face the
behemoth” of Chevron, but it has largely failed. It has failed
because the Supreme Court has not invoked it in clear and express
terms, and consequently, lower courts have either struggled to
apply it or avoided it altogether. Without further guidance from the
Supreme Court, Congress will continue to evade the laborious
117. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2660
(2003).
118. Id. at 2654.
119. Calabresi et al., supra note 116, at 537.
120. Garrett, supra note 117, at 2660.
121. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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legislative requirements imposed by the Constitution by permitting
agencies—headed by bureaucrats not directly accountable to the
people—to make major decisions that Congress itself has failed to
make. A Supreme Court decision that explicitly invokes the major
questions doctrine will not only make clear to agencies the bounds
of their authority, but it will also force Congress to “speak clearly”
when it wishes for agencies to resolve major questions while further
ensuring that the “gaps” that Congress “implicitly” intends for
agencies to fill are actually implicit.

